A plaintiff in an institutional child sexual assault case had argued that his claims were timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. In rejecting this argument the court reasoned that, in order to find that the defendant was equitably estopped from asserting a limitation defense, the plaintiff would had to have been aware of his right to sue, and then fail to file because of the defendant’s conduct. In somewhat of a Catch-22 for the plaintiff the court concluded that this is contrary to his asserted position that he had no memory of the alleged abuse.

Numerous courts around the country have applied the delayed discovery doctrine to cases alleging childhood sexual abuse where the emotional response resulting from childhood molestation, “often coupled with authoritative adult demands and threats for secrecy,” may lead a child to deny or suppress such abuse from his or her consciousness. In 1992, the Florida legislature amended the limitation period applicable to intentional torts based on abuse. The relevant provision currently provides: An action founded on alleged abuse ... or incest ... may be commenced at any time within 7 years after the age of majority, or within 4 years after the injured person leaves the dependency of the abuser, or within 4 years from the time of discovery by the injured party of both the injury and the causal relationship between the injury and the abuse, whichever occurs later. Several courts have held that this section applies only to intentional tort claims against the perpetrator of the sexual abuse and not claims against an institution based on respondent superior or other theories of liability in which an individual or institution can be held liable for the intentional criminal acts of another.

Part 2: In its analysis, the Court concluded that there was no showing or finding that without the prospect of a multiplier to an otherwise reasonable fee award, the Plaintiffs would have had difficulty finding competent counsel. The court held that there should be evidence in the record and findings of the court that without risk-enhancement the plaintiff would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other relevant market. If there is no evidence that the relevant market required a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel, then a multiplier should not be awarded. "Simply put, there was no evidence that the Tampa Bay legal market could not provide competent counsel for the [Plaintiffs’] case at the prevailing hourly rates. Certainly, most (all?) attorneys would prefer to collect twice their market rate at the conclusion of a successful contingency fee case, a point that perhaps needed no expert testimony to illuminate. It does not follow, though, that that preference would create a dearth of competent lawyers who would have taken this case at the prevailing rate. On that critical point, this record is silent."

As noted by the Court, the facts of the case are pretty straightforward. The insured homeowners suffered a loss when a refrigerator water line broke and caused some flooding inside their house. They sought coverage from their insurer under their property insurance policy. The insurer retained a remediation company to drain the water and dry out the property. A dispute arose between the parties concerning an “Option to Repair” provision in the policy, the scope of remedial work that would be required to repair the damage from the leak, and the selection and hiring of a contractor to effectuate those repairs. Unable to reach an agreement with their insurer, the homeowners retained a law firm to represent them under a contingency fee arrangement. A subsequent jury trial yielded a verdict in favor of the homeowners.