SPECIAL MASTERS UNDER RULE 53:  
The “EXCEPTIONAL” BECOMES “COMMONPLACE”

David Ferleger, Esq.¹

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, and increasingly since the amendment of Rule 53 in 2003, courts turn to special masters in constitutional, commercial, disabilities, mass tort and other litigation for assistance at all stages in the adjudication process. Masters may be appointed pre-trial, to preside over trials, and in the post-trial monitoring and compliance phases of a suit. The use of masters has been constructive and

¹ David Ferleger, Esq., has served federal courts as a court monitor in a class action and as Rule 53 special master in another lawsuit. He has written and taught on special masterships. He is an attorney in private practice. 10 Presidential Blvd, Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004, http://www.ferleger.com. Email david@ferleger.com.
beneficial to litigants and to the courts. Few administrative difficulties have been reported.

The volume, breadth and complexity of litigation in the 21st Century, combined with the limited resources of the courts, practically demands that the use of special masters by has become commonplace in cases which are either not ordinary or in which parties consent to the use of a master. As the chair of the subcommittee which drafted the amended rule explained:

The modern practice and use of special masters gradually evolved from a strict and limited role for trial assistance prescribed by Rule 53 to a more expanded view, with duties and responsibilities of masters extending to every stage of litigation. Recognizing that practice had stretched beyond the language of the long-standing rule, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules undertook an effort to conform the rule to practice. The result is a new rule (effective Dec. 1, 2003) that differs markedly from its predecessor and sets forth precise guidelines for the appointment of special masters in the modern context.²

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 has been a primary support for this approach. Courts also have, and continue to declare, their inherent authority to appoint masters “beyond the provisions” of Rule 53.³

Pre-2003, appointment of a master was reserved to the “exceptional case” and there was significant dispute in particular instances over whether a case was sufficiently


³ Satyam Computer Services, Ltd. v. Venture Global Engineering, LLC, 2007 WL 1806198 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (“Beyond the provisions” of Rule 53, court has inherent power to appoint master.”); In re World Trade Center Disaster Site, 2006 WL 3627760 (S.D.N.Y.,2006) (“inherent power to seek assistance in order to administer the cases before me efficiently, economically, and in the interests of justice.”).
exceptional to warrant a master. The 2003 rule in effect abandoned the notion that appointment of a master is disfavored, and many features of the rule are now designed to facilitate expanded use of masters.\footnote{For the “notion,” see La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 257-258 (1957) (appointment is disfavored; masters should be used only in rare cases). The amended Rule 53 has not yet been interpreted by the courts or analyzed by commentators. Scheindlin & Redgrave, Revisions in Federal Rule 53 Provide New Options for Using Special Masters in Litigation, N.Y. State Bar Assn J. (Jan. 2004). Judge Shira A. Scheindlin chaired the subcommittee on Rule 53 for the Advisory Committee and is co-author of this short article summarizing the changes. On the former rule, see Farrell, Margaret, Civil Practice and Litigation Techniques in the Federal Court, sponsored with the cooperation of the Federal Judicial Center, The Role of Special Masters in Federal Litigation, October 14, 1993 (Westlaw at C842 ALI-ABA 931).}

This article describes the early use of masters, the functions to which courts have put masters, and a selection of issues regarding the appointment and operation of masters.

II. **Early Use of Masters in Federal Court**

In the early 1900s, the Interstate Coal Company’s receiver, Walter Peterson, sued Arthur Davison, for $21,014 due on coal shipments. He was met with a $9,999.10 counterclaim. The federal judge was Augustus Hand, a cousin of Judge Learned Hand. Judge Augustus Hand was later to distinguish himself on the Second Circuit; he ruled, for example, on the obscenity charges against James Joyce’s *Ulysses*. Here, though, Judge Hand granted the defendant’s request that an “auditor” be appointed. Although the plaintiff’s claim consisted of only 298 items, the defendant’s counterclaim encompassed 402 items, including 123 deliveries on 91 different days over 11 months.

Pre-internet and pre-computers, and pre-electronic discovery, analysis of this mass of data was too much for the court and jury to take on unaided. The auditor was appointed to determine what was truly in dispute, to sift the evidence and to provide a report for the jury trial.

This coal delivery dispute resulted in the first detailed discussion of master-related
issues by the Supreme Court. Justice Brandeis wrote the opinion on the two questions presented: Does the auditor appointment violate the 7th Amendment’s jury trial provisions? It does not. Does the court have the inherent power to appoint such aides? Yes it does. Famously, Justice Brandeis said two things which resonate today:

“New devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution to present needs and to make it an efficient instrument of justice.”

From this flexibility flows the acceptability today of permitting a master’s report to be considered prima facie evidence of the facts found in the report. The source of the authority is foundational:

[Courts have] inherent power to provide themselves with instruments required for the performance of their duties. This power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause.”

Even without a parties’ consent, the Supreme Court teaches, a court can obtain the assistance it requires.

Justice Brandeis’ analysis had precursors, of course, an 1810 Chief Justice Marshall decision, an 1864 Supreme Court decision, but his words in In re Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 364-65 (1920). Accord, Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (power to appoint master to supervise implementation has long been established), amended in part, vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. den., 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 462 (1958) (“there has always existed in the federal courts an inherent authority to appoint masters.”).

Field v. Holland, 6 Cranch 8 (U.S.) (1810) (“They do not decree, but prepare materials on which a decree may be made.”); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. 123 (1864) (“Practice of referring actions with parties’ consent “is now universally regarded in the State courts as the proper foundation of judgment.”); Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524-25 (1889) (where reference to master was by consent, findings are "taken as presumptively correct").
Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), are most often cited when courts appoint judicial adjuncts. It has long been understood, even absent a rule on masters, that parties may consent to judgment based on a master’s ruling.

In the nineteenth century, special masters performed essentially clerical duties for courts, but those duties expanded and, by the late nineteenth century, masters routinely were authorized to take evidence and make non-binding recommendations to courts. The federal equity rules in 1912 restrained the use of masters, with Equity Rule 59 establishing the requirement, now in Federal Rule of Civil procedure 53(b), that references to masters be justified by an “exceptional condition.” State court rules and caselaw also provide for appointment of masters and other adjuncts.

Rule 53’s 2003 amendment recognized the tremendous expansion of the use of masters in the recent decades and supports judicious use of masters to perform the

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8 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) ("litigants may waive their personal right to have an Article III judge preside over a civil trial"); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 127-128 (1864); Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerebrus, Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 206, 210-211 (3d Cir. 1985).


10 See, for example, Jackson v. Hendrick, 457 Pa. 405; 321 A.2d 603 (1974), tracing the history of appointment of masters and other judicial supports in Pennsylvania.
many duties previously identified by the courts.\footnote{Stylistic changes to Rule 53 are effective December 7, 2007. This article’s citation of the rule’s text is from the 2003 amendments.} In addition to more traditional pre-trial functions such as resolving discovery disputes, utilization of post-trial masters has become high-profile. Compliance oversight in protracted litigation can consume a tremendous amount of judicial resources. The view of the Advisory Committee on the 2003 Amendments reflects today’s reality: “Courts have come to rely on masters to assist in framing and enforcing complex decrees.”

III. MASTERS’ FUNCTIONS


appointed. Non-lawyer experts in the relevant field are often utilized.\textsuperscript{15} Sometimes, a master’s staff may include counsel to the master.\textsuperscript{16} On occasion, courts appoint multiple masters in a single case, typically where the issues are especially complex or require more than one area of expertise.\textsuperscript{17} The judicial burden of one such case

\textsuperscript{15} Inventory Locator Service LLC v. Partsbases, Inc., 2006 WL 1646091 (W.D.Tenn., 2006) (neutral computer expert); In re World Trade Center Disaster Site, 2006 WL 3627760 (S.D.N.Y., 2006) (“outstanding academics with special expertise in the field of mass torts”); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 425-427 (1st Cir. 1976) (panel of non-attorney masters appointed in school desegregation suit); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Reserve Plan, Inc., 364 F.2d 28, 30 (8th Cir. 1966) (accountant to compute damages); Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 154 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988) (economist as “technical advisor” on calculation of damages; Rule 53 noted); United States v. Cline, 388 F.2d 294, 295 (4th Cir. 1968) (surveyor; both master and expert witness); Fox v. Bowen, 656 F. Supp. 1236, 1253-1254 (D. Conn. 1987) (master employed medical experts re Medicare); New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 551 F. Supp. 1165, 1192-1194 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), rev’d in part on other grounds, 706 F.2d 956, 960 (2d Cir. 1983) (expert master to monitor compliance with consent decree was also empowered to hire assistants with experience in mental retardation); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp., 612 F. 2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (mental retardation expert); Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 660 F. Supp. 605, 613-618 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (three jail experts, one with expertise in medical areas and one in jail conditions, appointed to monitor prison remediation), modified on other grounds, 688 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D. Tex. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 903 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1990).

\textsuperscript{16} “Special Counsel” to Special Master was appointed in the Vioxx litigation to provide logistical support to the master, local facilities, and to manage the operating account of the Special Master who was a law professor. In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2007 WL 2309877 (E.D.La., 2007).

was described in this way:

This case has been very burdensome to the judicial system. In the close to four years that the case has been pending, the parties filed nine (9) motions, apart from the thirty (30) motions now pending. Two magistrate judges have handled innumerable discovery and trial disputes, including 2,300 objections to proposed trial evidence. The parties have also retained four (4) special masters to assist in resolving complex motions and supervising settlement talks. In addition, the Court has already issued five (5) significant opinions in this matter.18

“Because the functions performed by special masters, monitors and receivers vary in their intrusiveness into a defendants’ operations, these agents occupy places along a spectrum that lacks bright line boundaries.”19 The amended Rule 53 specifies for the first time three categories of masters: trial masters, pretrial masters and post-trial masters. The Advisory Committee provides this example of how the functions might overlap: “A pretrial master might well conduct an evidentiary hearing on a discovery dispute, and a post-trial master might conduct evidentiary hearings on questions of compliance.” Masters are not free-ranging agents of the appointing judges; their role is judicial and not generally investigative outside the bounds of Rule 53.20

panel appointed in class action sex discrimination suit with more than 10,000 potential claims); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 331 (8th Cir. 1977) (three-person panel appointed to review documents and conduct discovery in patent suit); United States v. AT&T Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (two masters in large antitrust suit).


It must also be recognized that there are costs, monetary and otherwise, to appointment of masters. The additional layer of a quasi-judicial officer increases communication costs and can lead to delay in adjudication due both to the time required for the master’s review and reporting, and then to rulings on objections to reports.21

In the discussion below I utilize the typology adopted by the amended Rule 53: pretrial, trial and post-trial. The fourth described category – the augmented special master (a term I have coined) – is alluded to by the Advisory Committee and is a subset of the post-trial mastership.

A. Pretrial Masters

With the district court’s authority hovering over the process, a master can be very effective in case management duties such as supervision of discovery or narrowing the issues with the parties. A master may be appointed to assist the parties to settle the case. This may be accomplished through mediation, facilitating settlement talks, early evaluation of the merits, or as a consequence of preliminary findings or recommendations by the master. Also, this use of the master permits exchange and examination of positions and facts which, in some instances, it may be preferable to shield from the court.

Using masters early in a lawsuit can result in extensive savings in cost and time, and can narrow the issues to be resolved at trial. The stage may also be set for the probable settlement discussions on the merits.

Examples of functions of pretrial masters are:

21 Some courts do not favor the “report and recommendation” process. An Iowa case involved 400 plaintiffs claiming crop damage to 1,500 fields over a six year period; plaintiffs had produced 1.5 million documents to discovery requests at the time the court was called upon to adopt a case management order for the next phase of litigation. A special master had been appointed to address document production and recommend a litigation plan. The court adopted a “A bellweather trial with preclusive effect” approach. Also, the court found that the Rule 53 report and recommendation process is “inherently cumbersome,” took back the the discovery issues, and withdrew the appointment of the master. Adams v. U.S., 2007 WL 2238883 (D. Idaho, 2007)
• Mediation and settlement

• Evaluation of claims

• Case management generally

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22 Lewis, The Special Master as Mediator, 12 Seton-Hall Legis. J. 75, 75-79 (1988); Goodrich Corp. v. Town of Middlesbury, 311 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. den., -- U.S. --, 156 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2003) (master to mediate, and if that failed, to hold hearings and file report); United States v. Charles George Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081, 1084 (1st Cir. 1994) (supervision of settlement discussions in CERCLA case); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig., 317 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2003) (facilitation of settlement between banks and putative class of Holocaust survivors); Hemely v. United States, 122 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1998) (supervision of settlement in ERISA case); Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1998) (supervision of settlement in ERISA case); Active Products Corp. v. A.H. Choitz & Co., 163 F.R.D. 274, 282-283 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (master worked 500 hours on settlement, more time than judge could have spent); Mayberry v. United States, 151 F.3d 855, 857 (8th Cir. 1998) (post-summary judgment assistance in settlement of damages); United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 50 F.3d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 1995) (supervision of discovery and settlement).

23 In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 14 F.3d 726, 729 (2d Cir. 1993) (determination of defendant's funds); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 712-713 (7th Cir. 1984) (evaluation of claims, including summary judgment motion); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 782-784 (9th Cir. 1996) (dual positions of master and court-appointed expert witness; supervised taking depositions in Philippines of 137 randomly selected claimants of human rights violations, reviewed claim forms submitted by all 9,541 opting-in members of class, and recommended compensatory damages for three subclasses; master testified to his efforts and conclusions and submitted report to jury). See Adrogue & Ratliff, The Independent Expert Evolution: From the "Path of Least Resistance" to the "Road less Traveled?,” 34 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 843 (2003)

• Discovery supervision
• Electronic discovery
• Preliminary rulings on privilege


E.g., Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81 (D.N.J. 2006) (appointment of discovery special master to monitor discovery compliance and ensure that all documents ordered to be produced are produced).

Diversified Group, Inc. v. Daugerdas, 304 F.Supp.2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (on motion to unseal summary judgment documents, post-settlement review by special master of documents covered by protective order with regard to attorney-client
- Interpretation of a settlement agreement\textsuperscript{28}
- Coordination of parallel or related multiple cases\textsuperscript{29}
- Addressing possible fabrication of evidence\textsuperscript{30}

The discovery supervision function merits further comment. In the cases noted, a master has been appointed due to unusual discovery needs, such as the complexity or volume of material, or the multiplicity of issues or parties. Courts occasionally must address particularly difficult behavior by parties or counsel who do not cooperate in discovery, even in relatively simple cases. In these frustrating circumstances, courts have appointed (or considered or threatened appointment of) masters.

Should the parties continue to be unable to resolve any discovery disputes without the aid of the Court, I will have to consider whether to enlist the aid of a special master pursuant to Rule 53. While I do not view the case as particularly complex, the parties' seeming inability to


work together to resolve even the most basic of disputes has resulted in an endless barrage of motions. Perhaps the parties need the guiding hand of an individual, to be compensated by them, who can more fully devote himself or herself to the task of working out discovery disputes without the distraction of a full docket.  

**B. Trial Masters**

The definition of “trial master” is not as crisp as the words themselves imply. Rule 53 masters may be assigned trial duties and masters may be appointed to act as experts, and to testify as such. Parties may agree to have their dispute heard by a master, either for final decision or subject to review by the court. The court may refer trial of matters to a master for findings and recommendations. Except where parties waive their right to review by the court, the court maintains some involvement and ultimate control over acceptance of the master’s work.

Since 2003, the use of masters (and magistrate judges acting as masters) to hear and report on the merits of cases appears to have increased. A court’s docket may be advanced in this fashion without compromising the parties’ ability to obtain the district judge’s review of the merits, if necessary. As one court explained,

> Review of the master’s findings will be de novo under Rule 53(g)(4), but the advantages of initial determination by a master may make the process more effective and timely than disposition by the judge acting alone.  

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There are at least two functions which straddle the fence between pretrial and trial functions and which appear to be countenanced by the amended rule: a) taking and interpretation of technical or complex evidence and b) compilation of data. At trial, contemporary masters, like the auditor appointed for the 1920 In Re Peterson case decided by the Supreme Court, make findings presented, even mid-trial, to juries in cases tried before a court. For example, in a case involving churning in used car sales, phase one of the trial was interrupted with the court recessing the trial and then having a master, making findings during the weeks’ long recess, on each of many hundreds’ class members’ damage claims. Then, the jury reconvened to consider the master’s report (and the parties’ evidence) before deciding the damage awards.

A mid-trial use of masters has also occurred. Masters have been interposed in the

33 E.g., Snyder v. Department of Defense, 2007 WL 951293 (N.D.Cal.,2007) (“highly technical dimensions” of this FOIA case justified a master); Domingo v. T.K., 289 F.3d 600, 604-605 (9th Cir. 2002) (trial court appointed "technical advisor" to evaluate proffered expert testimony under Daubert). In Daubert, the Court required trial courts acting under Evidence Rule 702 to assure that scientific expert testimony is relevant and reliable before admitting it. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 309 U.S. 579, 593-594 (1993).

34 Latin American Music Co. v. The Archdiocese Of San Juan Of The Roman Catholic & Apostolic, --- F.3d ----, 2007 WL 2326817 (1st Cir. 2007) (in copyright case, special master to examine the documentation pertaining to the chains of title as to all of the songs at issue in consolidated cases); Rispler v. Sol Spitz Co., Inc., 2006 WL 3335056 (E.D.N.Y.,2006) (accounting of all the retirement trust accounts and profit sharing plans); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 289 (E.D. Tex. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (master to profile claims of 1,000 member class for jury).

35 Chisolm v. TranSouth Financial Corp., 194 F.R.D. 538 (E.D.Va. 2000). See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F.Supp. 1460, 1462 (D.Haw.1995), aff’d, Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776 (9th Cir.1996) (three phase trial; to determine harm, special master took 137 depositions from among 9,541 facially valid claims; federal jury then tried the compensatory damages issue, modifying the master’s conclusions in a number of ways).
midst of a jury trial in which a class’ claims were being considered. For example, in a case involving churning in used car sales, phase one of the trial was interrupted with the court recessing the trial and then having a master, making findings during the weeks’ long recess, on each of many hundreds’ class members’ damage claims. Then, the jury reconvened to consider the master’s report (and the parties’ evidence) before deciding the damage awards.

Another role, “technical advisor,” may not fall strictly within the contemplation of amended Rule 53, but it is a role with a fine ancestry and one long accepted as within a court’s inherent authority. The technical advisor to the court is, in effect, a teacher and sounding board to the court, and provides guidance on complex or specialized subject matter. When an advisor is utilized, the trial court conducts

36 Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988) (no abuse of discretion to appoint technical advisor to assist in calculating damages in medical malpractice case; Rule 53 noted but not relied upon); Reed v. Cleveland Board of Education, 607 F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1979) (technical advisor to assist special master); Beth V. v. Carroll, 155 F.R.D. 529 (E.D. Pa 1994) (review of consent decrees and class certification by master). A court may appoint an advisor simply for the court’s education in a technical field. In Xilinx, Inc. v. Altera Corp., 1997 WL 581426 (N.D.Cal. 1997) (NO. 93-20409 SW, 96-90922 SW), a patent case, the Court explained:

Here, the Court finds it appropriate to appoint an independent technical advisor to assist the Court in understanding the relevant technology. The technical advisor will not contribute evidence or render conclusions of law. See Reilly v. U.S., 863 F.2d 149, 154-61 (1st Cir. 1988). Rather, the Court will appoint an electrical engineer, who is not a lawyer, to help the Court educate itself on programmable logic devices.

Accord, Danville Tobacco Ass’n v. Bryant- Buckner Assoc., Inc., 333 F.2d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 1964) (appointee did not serve as a master; rather, the “Court chose him as an expert for its guidance.”); Scott v. Spanger Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1962) ("Appellate courts no longer question the inherent power of a trial court to appoint an expert under proper circumstances, to aid it in the just disposition of a case."); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales Practices
the trial with support from the advisor. 37

The technical advisor is appointed to the judge's staff. The most detailed discussion of the role and historical and legal support is by Senior District Judge Pettine, Rhode Island, in Reilly v. United States, 682 F.Supp. 150 (D.R.I. 1988), in which he needed to determine damages for loss of earning capacity of an infant who had been negligently injured at birth:

Briefly, the method contemplates the appointment of an expert to the judge's staff. The expert becomes, in effect, a specialized law clerk. He sits throughout the trial or otherwise familiarizes himself with the relevant testimony and evidence and then advises the court in camera. He does not testify or appear as a witness. Id. at 420. The role of the technical advisor may be viewed as fulfilling five separate functions. First, the technical advisor translates and interprets for the court the technical language used in the case. Second, he offers an exposition and delineation of the technical disagreement between the parties. Third, he relates this disagreement to the broader principles of the science or technical art involved. Fourth, he presents his own opinion on the technical facts and related matters at issue. Finally, he may conduct pertinent experiments, either on his own or in cooperation with others.

Upholding Judge Pettine, the appeals court noted that such situations would be rare, but that it was reasonable here.

"In fine, the advisor's role is to act as a sounding board for the judge-helping the jurist to educate himself in the jargon and theory disclosed by the testimony and to think through the critical technical problems." 38
The technical advisor is a tutor to the court. One court appointed a technical advisor to explain highly technical and scientific issues related to remedy in action alleging violations by the government of the Sustainable Fisheries Act.

The scope of the expert advisor's duties will be to answer the district court's technical questions regarding the meaning of terms, phrases, theories and rationales included in or referred to in the briefs and exhibits of any of the parties; he shall be a tutor who aids the court in understanding the jargon and theory relevant to the technical aspects of the evidence.39

With the growing recognition of the need for judicial adjuncts, one would expect courts to increase their use of technical experts who can provide a non-partisan perspective which may not be available from the party’s experts in cases of unusual complexity.

C. Post-trial Masters

Rule 53’s amendment in 2003 caps several decades of intensified use of special masters and other adjuncts in the post-judgment period. Administration of class actions, mass tort cases, monetary judgments and structural injunctions can involve complexities far beyond the resources of individual federal judges to superintend. When one adds the months or years of attention these cases require, and the

possibility of enforcement activity post-judgment, it is not surprising that the use of masters has become commonplace in such cases, with both litigants and courts appreciatively turning to adjuncts to ensure that justice is served, even though the former Rule 53 did not specifically describe the use of masters post-judgment.\textsuperscript{40}

A settlement or other court order may require monitoring or supervision. A master is likely to have both more time and more expertise than the federal judge to attend to the often daily needs of the parties in the suit. A master can spend time with the parties, and on site at offices, facilities or programs. A master can access facilities for administration of settlements, analysis of documents, and the like. Also, a master can assemble consultants and experts necessary to perform his or her functions. These activities are not those to which courts are accustomed. It is often the case that, over years, many dozens of disputes must be mediated or resolved otherwise; a court is not in a position to provide the needed time to such efforts.

Among the post-trial functions of masters are:

- Drafting opinions;\textsuperscript{41}

- Administration and distribution of settlement or judgment funds;\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} Scheindlin & Redgrave, Revisions in Federal Rule 53 Provide New Options for Using Special Masters in Litigation, N.Y. State Bar Assn J. (Jan. 2004).


\textsuperscript{42} McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 582, 612 (D.N.J. 1989) (master to aid in post-liability settlement of damages for 5,000 claimants); Brock v. Ing, 827 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1987); Whitehouse v. LaRoche, 277 F.3d 568, 571 (1st Cir. 2002) (master to oversee establishment and use of settlement fund for new sewage treatment facility); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., Nos. 00-9595(CON), 00-9597(CON), 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 17343, (2d Cir. July 26, 2001) (master to oversee allocation and distribution of proceeds in case alleging that Swiss banks profited from Holocaust). See Federal Judicial Center, Manual For Complex Litigation, Third, § 30.41 (Matthew Bender 1995); Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trusts, 53 Law & Contemp. Prob. 79 (1990).
• Monitoring of compliance with structural injunctions, especially those involving employment or other organizational change, or requiring reform in government services agencies.

43 Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 5 F.3d 186, 188 (6th Cir. 1993) (master to monitor compliance re promotions of victims of gender discrimination in employment).


“In contrast to the referee or special master, the monitor’s sole authority is to gather information, assess the extent to which defendants are complying with the decree, report to the court, and offer assistance in resolving minor disputes.” Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 Univ. Ill. L. Rev. 725, 733. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.Supp. 216, 248, 265-67 (D. Mass. 1975), aff’d, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. den., 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 861 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1988) (master to monitor compliance re state treatment of children with retardation placed in out of state institutions); Juan F. v. Weicker, 37 F.3d 874, 876 (2d Cir. 1994) (master to oversee defendants' compliance with court-ordered improvements in child welfare system); Harris v. Philadelphia, 137 F.3d 209, 214 (3d Cir. 1998) (master to monitor city's compliance with consent decree); Alexander S. v. Boyd, 113 F.3d 1373, 1378 (4th Cir. 1997) (master to oversee state's implementation of court-ordered improvements in conditions at juvenile detention facilities); In re Scott, 163 F.3d 282, 283 (5th Cir. 1998) (master to monitor implementation of judgments and injunction re conditions in state prisons); Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250, 255-256 (4th Cir. 1990) (master to oversee decree requiring reforms at state psychiatric hospital); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1159-1163 (5th Cir. 1982) (prisons consent decree); Bogard v. Wright, 159 F.3d 1060, 1062 (7th Cir. 1998) (compliance with consent decree re treatment at state mental hospitals); Inmates of
• Neutral observer within defendant’s entity,\textsuperscript{45}
• Recommendations to defendant regarding compliance techniques;\textsuperscript{46}
• Analysis of the continuing efficacy of a decree;\textsuperscript{47}
• Investigation,\textsuperscript{48}
• Issuance of binding recommendations.;\textsuperscript{49}

D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 158 F.3d 1357, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (jail conditions); Hook v. Arizona, 120 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 1997) (prison reform decree); Jones v. Wittenberg, 73 F.R.D. 82, 85-86 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (master has power to hold hearings, access prison files, hold confidential interviews with personnel and inmates, request show cause orders from the court).

\textsuperscript{45} Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 190 (5th Cir.), \textit{reh’g den.}, 564 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978), \textit{rev’d in part}, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).


\textsuperscript{47} In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653, 659-660 (1st Cir. 1993) (master to investigate continuation of consent decree re treatment center in light of changed operations and legislation); United States v. Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1506 (11th Cir. 1993) (master to consider continued need for decree in employment discrimination case which had been in effect for 20 years).

\textsuperscript{48} United States v. Moss-American, 78 F.R.D. 214 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (master appointed to supervise the taking of samples of defendant’s soil).

\textsuperscript{49} Larios v. Cox, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3446 (N.D. Ga., Mar. 2, 2004) (master's role is to formulate reapportionment plans); Taylor v. Perini, 413 F.Supp. 189, 193 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (master empowered with “authority to state to the defendant . . . the actions required to be taken by them . . . to effectuate full compliance with the Court’s order . . . .”). In \textit{New York Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Carey}, 631 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1980), under a consent decree regarding a retardation institution, a Review Panel of experts had authority to make recommendations which bound
• Review of fee applications.\textsuperscript{50}

**D. The Augmented Master**

The “augmented master” or “robust master” function, while not described as such in Rule 53, describes the flavor of a mastership when a court is faced with repeated non-compliance or a very uncooperative defendant. The drafters of the rule anticipated the need for strong mastership authority when necessary to rein in difficult defendants. The augmented master’s emphasis is at the vigorous enforcement end of the continuum of masters’ functions.

In the ordinary case there is no need for anything beyond the typical Rule 53 master whose work is often in the neutral problem-solving, reporting or investigation domains. Most defendants seek to comply with court orders in good faith, and most disputes can be resolved quickly by the court or through the usual dispute resolution methods incorporated into settlements.

Even a critic of the unbridled use of masters in an ad hoc manner agrees that “a referral often is an appropriate solution to counter noncompliance with a court’s previous orders.”\textsuperscript{51} Where defendants become intransigent, courts may find it necessary to consider tough enforcement activity, both to accomplish the purposes of the decree and to vindicate the court’s authority. The augmented master fits the

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\textsuperscript{50} Signature Homes of Hawaii, LLC v. Cascade Sur. and Bonding, Inc., 2007 WL 2258725 (D.Haw. 2007); In re Prudential Ins. Co. America Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 278 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2002); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Hedeen & Cos., 280 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 2002); Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2000); Gottlieb v. Barry, 43 F.3d 474, 486-487 (10th Cir. 1994).

Rule 53 accepts that there are situations which demand heightened policing. Masters do not have the authority themselves to compel government or other defendants to comply with court orders. However, as the Supreme Court has recognized, some level of interference with the offending party’s systems is inevitable and appropriate “to put an end to petitioners’ discriminatory ways.” Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 482 (1986). Citing Local 28, the Advisory Committee’s note to the amended Rule 53 cites this case in observing the appropriateness of the use of a master “when a complex decree requires complex policing, particularly when a party has proved resistant or intransigent.”

Whether for the traditional master or the augmented robust master, a court may appoint an adjunct under one or a combination of sources of authority other than the inherent power and Rule 53. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70, mentioned rarely, permits a master to take specific action which defendants have failed to

52 The term “augmented master” is intended to convey the concept of a traditional Rule 53 master/monitor, with added authority under the amended Rule 53, Rule 70, perhaps the All Writs Act and the court’s inherent powers.

53 E.g., Toussaint v. McCarthy, 597 F.2d 1388 (N.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. den., 481 U.S. 1069 (1069) (in prison case, order of reference allowed master to “require the release of prisoners assigned to segregation without sufficient basis;” on appeal, noted that this raised “serious questions”); National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 545 (9th Cir. 1987) (master could monitor and act as hearing officer post-judgment, but could not direct activities of defendant government agents) (“Masters may not be placed in control of governmental defendants for the purpose of forcing them to comply with court orders.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 578-79 (6th Cir. 1981) (appointment of master with broad oversight powers in housing case reversed; failure to use least intrusive method), cert. den., 456 U.S. 926 (1982).

54 See Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial Special Masters in Federal Institutional Reform Litigation: The History Reconsidered, 17 U.C. Davis
The rule would most appropriately be invoked where the action is specifically defined in a prior court order or other enforceable obligation. The All Writs Act is another source of a court’s power to draft remedial orders including consideration of a master or other adjunct. Under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §1651(a), in addition to its use to support the master, a court may issue a Writ of Assistance to compel non-cooperating entities to assist in ensuring compliance to judicial directives.  

Rule 66 acknowledges the existence and participation of receivers in federal litigation.

Sometimes defiance of the law is so ingrained in a party that the court’s intrusiveness cannot be avoided. “Courts correctly perceive, either initially or after years of noncompliance, that the underlying causes of the legal violation disable


Rule 70 provides:

If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by the court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the party.

See National Organization for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 828 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1987) (master appointed to monitor cooperative state and federal law enforcement organization); E.g., United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977) (district court order directing telephone company to provide law enforcement officials with assistance to implement court order authorizing use of pen registers; such order is authorized by All Writs Act); Hamilton v. MacDonald, 503 F.2d 1138 (9th Cir. 1974) (writ of assistance to deliver joint possession in joint use area to excluded Indian tribe, under All Writs Act); United States v. 63-39 Trible Rd., 860 F.2d 72 (E.D. N.Y. 1994) (All Writs Act supports order empowering marshal to enter and take possession of premises, and to evict all occupants and property, and to dispose of premises in accordance with earlier forfeiture decree).
the defendants from complying with a general directive to cease violation the law." A master can assist the court in moving beyond general directives. Masters have been appointed to consider recommendations for contempt, for example.

As the non-compliance level rises, or the periods of non-compliance increase, so does the court’s power to respond with supervision, enforcement actions or contingent plans. In a case involving community services for people with retardation, one court ordered contingent $10,000 per day fines both with regard to treatment issues regarding individual class members, and systemic failure to make or implement plans; a special master was appointed as well. In another case, the master was empowered to define the contours of compliance. In yet another case,


59 Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 465, 491 (1980) (arguing that detailed supervision is needed due to case complexity and defendants’ intransigence).

60 Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 154 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Holding state and local defendants in contempt for violation of a 1985 consent decree, the court there ordered creation and implementation of plans for such things as abuse/neglect investigations and medical care, and appointed a special master who was empowered to approve the plans. Other plans have since been ordered based on the master’s recommendations. The $10,000 daily fines are contingent; they would not be imposed unless there is further non-compliance.

61 Taylor v. Perini, 413 F.Supp. 189, 193 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (special master empowered with “authority to state to the defendant . . . the actions required to be taken by them . . . to effectuate full compliance with the Court’s order . . .”). See Juan F. v. Weicker, 37 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1994) (dependent and neglected children; court monitor empowered to take any and all action to effect timely compliance was a special master, albeit by another name); Hook v. Arizona, 120 F.3d 921, 926
the court was faced with a second effort by plaintiffs to obtain a contempt citation and appointment of a master; the court had rebuffed an earlier effort to provide more time for defendants to implement required changes on their own. Focusing on the school district’s failures both to develop and implement effective plans, the court concluded that a special master was essential to help defendants “fashion coherent and precise goals and plans;” the master would be “someone to direct its resources for it.”

The augmented special master may be conceived as one step short of appointment of a receiver for a recalcitrant defendants. Judicial power to ensure that

(9th Cir. 1997) (compliance with prison reform decree; state had been recalcitrant in complying with decree).


If General Eisenhower had planned and implemented D-Day the same way these defendants go about assaulting the District's many problems, we would still be waiting for the first parachute to pop open. * * * When fashioning a remedy for civil contempt, the court seeks to coerce future compliance with its orders and to remedy past noncompliance. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-04 (1947). Fining the defendants will not achieve either goal. In order to move toward compliance, the District needs an individual who can help it fashion coherent and precise goals and plans. It needs someone to direct its resources for it. The Department refuses to take a managerial, hands-on approach to the Remedial Orders. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 53(b) provides that courts may appoint masters in cases involving exceptional circumstances.

Ten years after the Duane B. case was filed and after the master had completed his work, defendants were purged of contempt. See Duane B., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24497 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 20, 2002).

violations of court orders does not automatically support receivership or other drastic remedies, of course.\textsuperscript{64} It is “an extraordinary step warranted only by the most compelling circumstances.”\textsuperscript{65} Federal courts do not, and should not, assume control of institutions “in the absence of substantial evidence”\textsuperscript{66} that defendants have flouted their obligations for compliance with the court’s orders.\textsuperscript{67} While some commentators elide the differences between a master and a receiver,\textsuperscript{68} there is definitely a difference in how the roles of these two court adjuncts have been conceived. While monitors and masters generally aid a court in adjudication and implementation, a receiver is responsible for custody and management of an entity to prevent harm to a parties’ rights.\textsuperscript{69} Just as with special masters, receivers have

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\textsuperscript{64} See Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 477 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1263 (9th Cir. 1982) (placing master in control of state prison would have been error).


\textsuperscript{66} The phrase is from Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979).


\textsuperscript{68} For example, receivers may be lumped together with masters and mediators. DeGraw, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and Institutional Reform: The Lack of Limits on Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 800 n. 4. (1991) (“In the institutional reform context, upon which this Note focuses, special masters are referred to as administrators, masters, mediators, monitors, ombudsmen, and receivers.”).

\textsuperscript{69} Johnson, Equitable Remedies: An Analysis of Judicial Neoreceiverships to
been appointed post-judgment to assist in implementation. Receiverships have been used to protect civil rights from state infringement and in environmental cases.\(^70\)

There are limits to the efficacy and advisability of the use of a receiver. A master’s effectiveness may be decreased if he or she becomes a receiver with authority over all aspects of the defendant facility’s or system’s operations.\(^71\) Also, the court -- rather than the defendants -- may be blamed for failures to comply. Finally, receivership raises complex questions of how post-receivership contempt liability can be determined and remedied.

Where a court is faced with intransigent defendants, the augmented special mastership is consistent with the post-trial roles accepted in the caselaw and permitted under Rule 53. This mastership has the advantage of support in Rule 53, and avoids the challenges of receivership which should continue to be reserved for extreme situations.

The following elements might be among those in an order for an “augmented mastership:”

\[\text{Implement Large Scale Institutional Change, 1976 Wis. L. Rev. 1161.}\]


\(^{71}\) DiIulio, The Old Regime and the Ruiz Revolution: The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Texas Prisons, in Courts, Corrections and the Constitution 62-63 (J. DiIulio ed. 1990) (staff confusion and negative effect on morale); Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 Duke L. J. 1265, 1299 (giving orders to staff on operational matters raises questions of organizational accountability and lines of authority).
• Specific findings of contempt, including willful disobedience and/or conscious decisions to violate or ignore prior orders;

• Citation of all possible bases for authority for the special master, including: court’s inherent power, Rules 53 and 70 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (perhaps also to Rule 66), the All Writs Act, and the court’s powers to sanction contempt and to vindicate its own authority;

• Power to plan, organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation of the court’s orders

• Use of substantial contingent fines, including daily or other periodic fines, for non-performance of specific tasks and/or non-achievement of specific goals.

• Emphasis on the judicial role of master with regard to making recommendations for contempt.

• Provisions that any interference with the exercise by the master, or any staff or consultant of the master, of the powers and duties of the master under this Order constitutes contempt of this Court.

72 See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (powers to “plan, organize, direct, supervise and monitor” upheld) (prior & subsequent history omitted); Taylor v. Perini, 413 F.Supp. 189, 193 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (special master empowered with “authority to state to the defendant . . . the actions required to be taken by them . . . to effectuate full compliance with the Court’s order . . . ”).

73 Contingent fines were included in the 1994 Pennhurst contempt orders. Note also the apparently approving description of threatened contingent fines by the Supreme Court in Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 277 (1990) in an “important remedial order,” the district court “had secured compliance” by a threat of fines in a “schedule of contempt fines” which would have resulted in “imminent bankruptcy for the city;” later “the same day” there was compliance) (emphasis in original).

74 Possible language might be: “Any interference with the exercise by the master, or any staff or consultant of the master, of the powers and duties of the master under this Order constitutes contempt of this Court.”
staff or consultant of the master, of the powers and duties of the master under the order constitutes contempt of the court.

- Expedite litigation of issues by requiring that no compliance issues or evidence may be raised to the court unless first presented to the master.  

- Direction to master to request orders, including writs of assistance, from the court with respect to need for action by both parties and non-parties to obtain assistance or compliance.

IV. Special Masters’ Appointment and Operations

The rule was revised several years ago for the explicit purpose of reflecting “changing practices in using masters.” As discussed above, for the first time since its 1938 origins, the rule specifically recognizes that masters may be appointed to perform both pretrial and post-trial functions, in addition to the trial function emphasized by the prior rule.

Possible language might be:

a. The court will entertain no objection to any report or recommendation by the master, unless it is shown as a preliminary matter that an identical objection was submitted to the master in the form of a specific written objection.

b. Any evidence not previously presented to the master in the course of the formal hearing preceding the master’s report will be admitted at a hearing before the court only upon a showing that the party offering it lacked a reasonable opportunity to present the evidence to the master.

Advisory Committees note to 2003 Amendment of Rule 53. On the range of masters’ activities, see Willging, et al., Special Masters’ Incidence and Activity (Federal Judicial Center 2000).

Rule 53’s language has now caught up to Rule 53 in practice. Rule 53 and the Advisory Committee’s accompanying commentary, recognize that modern litigation needs require full-bodied masterships and that it need no longer be the exceptional case which can benefit from a master.

The amended rule clarifies provisions on appointment of a master (both with consent and without consent), and on his or her functions, specifying a ‘table of contents’ for the order of reference. In a major change, the rule modifies the standard of review for findings of fact made or recommended by a master.

A. Appointment and Disqualification

The rule accepts the practice under the former rule of appointment of masters to functions agreed to by the parties.\(^\text{78}\) So long as the appointment meets with the court’s approval, and the master is not to preside at a jury trial, the parties can consent to a master performing any specified duties.\(^\text{79}\) A master may also be appointed without consent to address pre-trial and post-trial matters that cannot be “effectively and timely addressed” by an available judge or magistrate.\(^\text{80}\)

A master may also be appointed under Rule 53 without the parties’ consent, whether for trial proceedings or to make findings of fact in non-jury cases.\(^\text{81}\)

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\(^\text{78}\) The former rule did not provide for appointment of a master with the parties’ consent, although courts routinely did so.

\(^\text{79}\) Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1) ("a court may appoint a master ... to: (A) perform duties consented to by the parties"); Advisory Committee Note of 2003 ("Party consent does not require that the court make the appointment; the court retains unfettered discretion to refuse appointment."). The Advisory Committee notes that “in no circumstances may a master be appointed to preside at a jury trial.” This restriction ensures that jury trials remain in the domain of Article III judges.

\(^\text{80}\) Rule 53(a)(1)(C).

\(^\text{81}\) Rule 53(a)(1)(B). In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653, 659 (1st Cir. 1993) (parties’ consent not required for master to determine whether 20-year old consent decree should remain in effect); United States v. Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1506 (11th Cir. 1993) (master may be appointed without parties’ request or consent to investigate whether termination of consent decree is appropriate).
Without consent, the master may not be delegated the power to preside over a trial or make dispositive decisions, although the pretrial steps up to that point may be administered by a master.\textsuperscript{82}

A special master must file an affidavit showing that he or she is free from conflicts which would affect the master’s ability to fairly undertake the obligation. As is the case for judges, simply having views on an issue does not require disqualification. The issue arises more often for prospective masters than for judges since masters are often appointed due to existing academic or practical expertise on a subject and are likely to have expressed their views previously. One court rejected an objection to a nominee for master in this way:

Professor Lemley is a well-known and highly regarded academic in the field of patent law. That he has expressed views on patent law reform which urge legislation favorable to large technology companies does not disqualify him. In fact there are competing views on what the effect of patent law is on large technology companies. Some large technology companies favor patent law reform; other large technology companies oppose patent law reform. Anyone involved in patent law has views, or at least should have views, on what course patent law reform should take. Professor Lemley has filed the declaration required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 53, and stated that he knows of no reason that would require his disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455. The Court is satisfied that there is no reason to withdraw the appointment of Professor Lemley

Rule 53 is silent on when, or whether, parties’ consent to a master’s investigation may be withdrawn. In a 2006 case, the court refused to permit withdrawal of consent to an investigation which had already begun, but permitted the parties to withdraw consent to future investigations. \textit{U.S. v. Michigan}, 234 F.R.D. 636 (E.D. Mich. 2006).

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{In re Armco Inc.}, 770 F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1985) (constitutionally improper to refer trial on merits to master. It is proper to refer all pretrial matters, including discovery, production, arrangement of exhibits, stipulations of fact, as well as power to hear and make recommendations on dispositive motions).
as special master based on any expressed views.\textsuperscript{83} Special Masters are immune from liability to the same extent as judges are immune.\textsuperscript{84}

\textbf{B. Exceptional Condition Requirement}

The former Rule 53 permitted a master only under an “exceptional condition,” regardless of the purpose of the master. The current Rule 53 applies this limit only to trial masters. Pretrial and post-trial masters can be appointed even absent an “exceptional condition.”

Appointment of pre- and post-trial masters requires only that the matter at hand “cannot be addressed effectively and timely by an available district judge or magistrate judge of the district.” This standard is case-specific and judge-specific and is substantially lower than the former rule. The new standard recognizes that

\textsuperscript{83} Chrimar Systems, Inc. v. Powersdine, Ltd., 2007 WL 2688602 (E.D.Mich. 2007). See In re World Trade Center Disaster Site, 2006 WL 3627760 (S.D.N.Y., 2006) (“In sum, the writings of Professor Henderson and Dean Twerski, whose high academic quality is acknowledged by the parties, relate to the actions and proceedings about which they write, and not to the cases, parties, and attorneys in the cases over which I preside.”).

Conflicts may not always be simple to resolve. In a patent case, a court had denied a motion to vacate a reference to a master, despite serious disbarment proceedings against the master and civil litigation in which he as a defendant on fraud and patent issues. However, on a later motion, the court ordered that 50% of the master’s fee be disgorged in light of the master’s non-disclosure of the relevant events. Sportlite, Inc. v. Genlyte Thomas Group, LLC, 2007 WL 2324615 (D.Ariz., 2007). See In re Kempthorne, 449 F.3d 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (special master should have recused himself where he had hired a senior executive of an information technology company which had filed an administrative complaint against the defendant Department of the Interior, and master did not disclose the arrangement to the Department).

masters may be able to act more effectively and rapidly than judges. Dropping the exceptional condition requirement effectively opens the door to flexible utilization of masters where time, attention or need for special expertise is an issue.

The rule and the Advisory Committee’s notes recognize that masters may be involved in “investigation or enforcement,” two common duties in structural litigation which were never explicitly acknowledged in the prior rule. The Committee also notes as a possible duty the “administration of an organization” in addition to settlement talks and investigations. “The master’s role in enforcement may extend to investigation in ways that are quite unlike the traditional role of judicial officers in an adversary system.”

In discussing another topic (sealing of reports), the Committee alludes to two other roles for masters, i.e., settlement efforts and formulation of decrees.


c. Review of Appointment Order

An appointment order is interlocutory and, therefore, is not subject to immediate appellate review. It may be challenged immediately only through the extraordinary mandamus writ or appealed within an appeal of either a trial court order on a master’s report or when the appointment is intertwined with another order on appeal.


D. Order of Reference

85 Advisory Committee Note to 2003 Amendment to Rule 53.

86 Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290-291, 291 n.4, (1940); Sierra Club v. Browner, 257 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 2001); Hook v. Arizona, 120 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1997); Thompson v. Enomoto, 815 F.2d 1323, 1327 (9th Cir. 1987);

87 Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld, 818 F.2d 1089, 1096 (3d Cir. 1987) (appeal from final court order provided court of appeals with jurisdiction over previous appeal from interlocutory order of reference to master); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Department of Rev. of Wash., 934 F.2d 1064, 1071 (9th Cir. 1991) (order appointing master was indivisible from denial of preliminary injunction; both can be reviewed).
The prior rule was essentially silent on the content of the order of reference. The amended rule requires that the order direct the master “to proceed with all reasonable diligence” and the order “must state” terms in five areas (Rule 53(b)(2):

(2) Contents. The order appointing a master must direct the master to proceed with all reasonable diligence and must state:

(A) the master's duties, including any investigation or enforcement duties, and any limits on the master's authority under Rule 53(c);

(B) the circumstances -- if any -- in which the master may communicate ex parte with the court or a party;

(C) the nature of the materials to be preserved and filed as the record of the master's activities;

(D) the time limits, method of filing the record, other procedures, and standards for reviewing the master's orders, findings, and recommendations; and

(E) the basis, terms, and procedure for fixing the master's compensation under Rule 53(h).

Rule 53(b)(2) does not provide for the consequence of an appointment order which fails to include these matters. A California district court, considering a master’s report on a class action settlement, ruled on an objection which pointed out that the appointment order was deficient under the rule. The court rejected the objection, finding that in the particular circumstances, no harm was done by the omissions from the order.\textsuperscript{88} This is a reasonable approach. Unless a faulty order causes serious prejudice to a party or class member, it is likely that courts will not reject masters’ substantive reports based solely on an omission from the “table of contents” set forth in the rule.

Masters will confront a variety of circumstances which are not predictable. The appointment order need not anticipate the unknown and, when new matters brought to the court’s attention need to be addressed, the appointment order need not be

\textsuperscript{88} Glass v. UBS Financial Services, Inc., 2007 WL 221862 (N.D.Cal.,2007).
amended to include discrete items. 89

E. Rules of Evidence

Must a special master apply the federal Rules of Evidence? The law is developing with regard to this question, with the current weight answering in the negative.

The change in Rule 53 may be read to support the notion that there is no mandate that the master apply the Rules of Evidence. The current version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 contains no language suggesting that a special master must apply the Rules of Evidence where, as here, the order of reference is silent on the matter. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 (2006). The December 1, 2003 amendments removed language to the contrary from Rule 53. Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(c) (2002) (“When a party so requests, the master shall make a record of the evidence offered and excluded in the same manner and subject to the same limitations as provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence for a court sitting without a jury.”), with Fed.R.Civ.P. 53 (2006) (omitting same language), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(c) notes of advisory committee on 2003 amendments (“The most important delineation of a master's authority and duties is provided by the Rule 53(b) appointing order.”). A master’s use of hearsay evidence was contested in a recent district court case, and – based on the above comparison of the old and new rule, among other things -- the court held that a master is not bound by the evidentiary rules, much as courts reviewing administrative decisions may consider evidence which would not be admissible in a court trial:

89 U.S. v. Michigan, 234 F.R.D. 636 (E.D.Mich.,2006) (rejecting argument that each contract arising to be reviewed must be included in an amended order; “This would seem to defeat the purpose of having an order of appointment in post-trial matters, because the exact issues that will arise would rarely be predictable even when the general nature and category of disputes would be.”). Similarly, where a master had been appointed with the parties’ consent to make findings and conclusions on a parties’ liability and damages, but also reported on attorney’s fees, the court held that the fee issue was sufficiently within the ambit of the liability issue (though fees were not referenced in the parties’ consent) and were within the scope of the master’s authority. Perry Drug Stores v. NP Holding Corp., 2007 WL 2228694 (6th Cir. 2007).
In general, a special master has “broad discretion to regulate the manner in which he will complete his duties.” United States v. Clifford Matley Family Trust, 354 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.2004); cf. Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 149 (2d Cir.2003) (discussing broad discretion of special master). The courts and commentators that have addressed this issue have all concluded that absent explicit direction by the court to the contrary—a special master is not bound by the Rules of Evidence. See Matley, 354 F.3d at 1160-61 (holding that a special master did not have to follow the Rules of Evidence where the district court’s order of reference did not require him to do so); Allapattah Servs. v. Exxon Corp., No. 91-0986, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91611, at *10 (D.Fla. Dec. 15, 2006) (“Strict adherence to ... the Federal Rules of Evidence is not required in this matter.” (citing Matley, 354 F.3d at 1160)); 9-53 James Wm. Moore Et Al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 53.32 (2006) (“There is no requirement that a master performing an adjudicatory function adhere to the ... Federal Rules of Evidence, absent a reference order that so requires.” (citing Matley)). This Court agrees.90

Regardless of whether the rule requires it or not, it would seem the better course when a master is addressing the merits of claims or other substantive disputes to apply the Rules of Evidence. This simplifies review by the district and appellate courts and utilizes familiar standards for ascertaining the facts. Where issues are procedural or preliminary, or involve discovery or other pretrial disputes, there may be an argument in particular cases to adopt a more relaxed approach to evidence which may be considered.

**F. Court’s Actions**

The amended rule provides 20 days for parties to object to, or move to adopt or modify, a master’s order, report or recommendation, unless a court chooses a different time period. Rule 53(g)(2).91 The prior rule’s time period was 10 days, a

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91 To “expedite” the litigation, a court recently chose a 14 calendar day response time. Satyam Computer Services, Ltd. v. Venture Global Engineering, LLC, 2007
quite difficult deadline in a complex case.

The amended rule requires an opportunity to be heard (which may be on papers or in person) and provides that the court “may” receive evidence and “may” act in a variety of ways: affirm, adopt, modify, wholly or partly reject or reverse, or resubmit to the master with instruction. Rule 53(g)(1). While courts have always felt free to show such flexibility, the delineation of these options is useful and may also assist parties in suggesting to the court how it might proceed.

G. Standard of Review

Probably the most striking change in the new rule is the abandonment of the long-established “clearly erroneous” standard for review of a master’s fact findings. The former rule’s clearly erroneous standard applied only to trial master’s findings in nonjury cases, but the courts applied the standard to the findings of all Rule 53 masters. 92

Instead of the deference which district courts had been required to give to fact findings (similar to the deference which an appellate court gives to a trial court’s fact findings), the amended Rule 53 mandates that the court undertake his or her own review of the facts and decide “de novo” all objections to such findings. However, with the court’s consent, the parties may stipulate to the former “clear error” standard or that the master’s findings will be final. 93

“The court must decide de novo all objections to findings of fact made or recommended by a master.” Rule 53(g)(3). This requirement undermines a major rationale for appointment of masters, especially those with expertise in the subject

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93  Rule 53(g)(3).
matter. If a court must consider anew every factual finding, then tremendous time and energy will be required whenever a party objects to a master’s report. This new standard is quite difficult to apply since the court will not have heard witnesses, assessed their demeanor, and, especially in the enforcement or other post-trial situation, may not have the intricate knowledge of systemic issues or the background of the suit, or the technical information, to make a sound de novo decision. Also, this standard may multiply proceedings since courts may now be requested to hold hearings to receive further evidence and to ensure a full record for de novo review.

Courts have responded to the new review standard by reviewing the record as it exists before the master. While courts have the authority to receive additional evidence, they are likely to require parties to make some showing justifying (or explaining) the failure to present that evidence before the master. This prerequisite would go far to avoid a party’s abusive or strategic use of presentation of additional evidence. Absent some parameters, a party might be tempted to wait until after the master’s ruling to present certain evidence the party might think would be more influential with the trial judge.

Because courts appoint masters in order to receive the benefit of their special experience and attention to a case, courts are likely to continue to defer, to some extent at least, to the conclusions of masters who write well-reasoned and fully-supported decisions.

H. Procedural Decisions

Procedural decisions are upheld absent “abuse of discretion” by the master. Rule 53(g)(5). This reasonable standard expedites proceedings before a master and ensures that, in all but exceptional departures from required process, the master will be able to proceed with his or her work without undue interruption.

V. Conclusion

The use of Rule 53 special masters, for decades an “exceptional” practice, has now become familiar, common and, for complex cases, quite customary. Rule 53’s 2003 amendment builds on – and strongly supports -- the intensive and expansive use of masters by the federal courts over the last several decades. Masters are utilized extensively pre-trial both in discovery and in functions which facilitate settlement and other dispute resolution. Masters preside over trials, often with greater speed
than the appointing judge who must juggle a large caseload and must prioritize criminal cases. Where parties are extremely uncooperative, an augmented special master, whose authority is robust, is appropriate within the rules. Authority for an adjunct’s appointment other than Rule 53 may also be utilized.

While use of special masters is long accepted and an established adjunct to the courts, the “modern master” would be unfamiliar to courts thirty, forty or fifty years ago. Today, lawyers, judges, and litigants are employing a variety of innovative roles and processes that do not conform to the traditional adjudicative model. Both pretrial, trial and remedial activity by masters has expanded substantially.

Judicial use of masters and other adjuncts dates back to the Middle Ages and eventually to the English chancery origins of American equity practice. For hundreds of years court have recognized that there are situations in which an aide or specialist can serve the court to resolve litigation with less delay and with heightened effectiveness. The evolution of masterships, anticipated by the Supreme Court as early as 1920, has continued.

Rule 53’s embrace of a menu of mastership functions is likely to justifiably encourage courts and litigants to continue creative approaches to both the process and substance of litigation. The use of masters will increase, ultimately to the benefit of both those who seek and those who administer justice.

David Ferleger, Esq.
david@ferleger.com
610 668 2221